WirelessMoves

By chance I recently noticed that Firefox at some point has started to show detailed information on the encryption and key negotiation method that is used for a https connection. As I summarized in this post, there are many methods in practice offering different levels of security and I very much like that Wireshark tracing is no longer required to find out what level of security a connection offers.

A couple of days ago I read in this news report that T-Mobile USA has acquired some lower A-Block 700 MHz spectrum from Verizon it intends to use for LTE in the near future. To me as an outsider, US spectrum trading just leaves me baffled as network operators keep exchanging spectrum for spectrum and/or money. To me it looks a bit like the 'shell game' (minus the fraud part of course…).

Anyway, last year I did an analysis of how the 700 MHz band is split up in the US to get a better picture and you can find the details here. According to my hand drawn image and the more professionally done drawings in one of the articles that are linked in the post there's only 2×5 MHz left in the lower A-band, the famously unused lower part of band 12. Again the articles linked in my post last year give some more insight into why band 12 overlaps with band 17. Also, this Wikipedia article lists the company for band 12/17.

So these days it looks like the technical issues of not using the lower 5 MHz of band 12 have disappeared. How interesting and it will be even more interesting to see if AT&T will at some point support band 12 in their devices or whether they will stick to the band 17 subset. Supporting band 12 would of course mean that a device could be used in both T-Mobile US's and AT&T's LTE networks, which is how it is done in the rest of the world on other frequency bands for ages. But then, the US is different and I wonder if AT&T has the power to continue to push band 17.

One more thought: 2×5 MHz is quite a narrow channel (if that is what they bought, I'm not quite sure…), typically 2×10 MHz (in the US, Europe and Asia) or 2×20 MHz (mainly in Europe) channels are used for LTE today so I wouldn't expect speed miracles on such a channel.

If you think fake base stations are 'only' used as IMSI-catchers by law enforcment agencies and spies, this one will wake you up: This week, The Register reported that 1500 people have been arrested in China for sending spam SMS messages over fake base stations. As there is ample proof available how easy it is to build a GSM base station with the required software behind it to make it look like a real network I tend to believe that the story is not an early April fool's day joke. Fascinating and frightning at the same time. One more reason to keep my phone switched to 3G-only mode as in UMTS, mutual authentication of network and device prevent this from working.

Today I read for the first time in this post over at AnandTech that chipsets for mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets are now supporting USB 3.0. I haven't seen devices on sale yet that make use of it but once they do one can easily spot them as the USB 3.0 Micro-B plug is backwards compatible but looks different from the current USB 2.0 connector on mobile devices.

While smartphones and tablets are still limited to USB 2.0 in practice today, most current notebooks and desktops support USB 3.0 for ultra fast data exchange with a theoretical maximum data rate of 5 Gbit/s, which is roughly 10 times faster than the 480 Mbit/s offered by USB 2.0. In practice USB 3.0 is most useful when connecting a fast external hard drives or SSDs to another device, as these can be much faster than the sustainable data transfer rate of USB 2.0, which is around 25 MByte/s in practice. As ultra mobile devices such as tablets are replacing notebooks to some extent today, it's easy to see the need for USB 3.0 in such devices as well. And even smartphones might require USB 3.0 soon, as the hardware has become almost powerful enough for them to be used as full powered computing devices such as notebooks in the not too distant future. For details see my recent post 'Smartphones Are Real Computers Now – And The Next Revolution Is Almost Upon Us'.

Making use of the full potential of USB 3.0 in practice today is difficult even with notebooks that have more computing power than smartphones and tablets. This is especially the case when data has to be decrypted on the source device and re-encrypted again on the target devices as this requires the CPU to get involved. This is much slower than if the data is unencrypted and can thus just be copied and pasted from one device to another via fast direct memory access that does not require the CPU. In practice my notebook with an i5 processor can decrypt + encrypt data from the internal SSD to an external backup hard drive at around 40 MByte/s. That's faster than the maximum transfer speed supported by USB 2.0 but way below what is possible with USB 3.0.

I recently came across a press announcement that a German mobile network operator and a security company providing hardware and software for encrypted mobile voice calling have teamed up to launch a mass market secure and encrypted voice call service. That sounds cool at first but it won't work in practice and they even admitted it right in the press announcement when they said in a somewhat cloudy sentence that the government would still be able to tap in on 'relevant information'. I guess that disclaimer was required as laws of most countries are quite clear that telecommunication providers are required to enable lawful interception of the call content and metadata in real time. In the US, for example, this is required by the CALEA wire tapping act. In other words, network operators are legally unable to offer secure end-to-end encrypted voice telephony services. Period.

Wire tapping to get the bad guys once sounded like a good idea and still is. But from a trust perspective, the ongoing spying scandal shows more than clearly that anything less than end-to-end encryption is prone to interception at some point in the transmission chain by legal and illegal entities. Also, when you think about it from an Internet perspective, CALEA and similar other laws elsewhere are nothing less than if countries required web companies to provide a backdoor to their SSL certificates so they can intercept HTTPS secured traffic. I guess law makers can be glad they came up with CALEA and similar laws elsewhere before the age of the Internet. I wonder if this would still fly today?

Anyway, this means that to be really secure against wire tapping, a call needs to be encrypted end-to-end. As telecom companies are not allowed to offer such a service, it needs to come from elsewhere. Also, this means that there can't be a centralized hub for such a service, it needs to be peer-to-peer without a centralized infrastructure and the code must be open source so a code audit can ensure there are no backdoors. Also, no company can offer the service as it would be pressured and probably required by law to put in a backdoor (see e.g. Lavabit and Silent Circle).

This is quite a challenge and requires a complete rethinking of how to communicate over the Internet in the future at least for those who want privacy for their calls. And without companies being able to provide such a service it's going to be an order of magnitude more difficult. For private individuals this probably means that they have to put a server at home for call establishment and to tunnel the voice stream between fixed and mobile devices behind firewalls and NATs. For companies it means they have to put a server on their premises and equip their employees with secure voice call apps that contact their own server rather than that of a service provider.

While I already do this for instant messaging between members of my household (see my article on Prosody on a Raspberty Pi) I still haven't found something that could rival Skype in terms of ease of use, stability and voice + video quality.

Now here's a bit of a worrying thought: What if Microsoft decided tomorrow to cease support of the Skype Linux client tomorrow?

I recently had that thought after Microsoft yet again changed their terms and conditions to give them even more rights to store and analyze transactions. Long gone are the days in which Skype stood for a secure system with end-to-end encrypted connections nobody could snoop on. From that point of view one should not use it in the first place anyway and I have reduced it's use to the bare minimum.

I'm sure I could find and use an alternative with friends that think likewise but for communication with most people that's just not an option. If I want to talk to them or see them I have to use Skype and that's unlikely to change.

So coming back to the original question what I would do if Microsoft ceased Skype Linux support? After a worrying minute I came up with the answer that I'd probably just use it on an Android tablet (or an Android smartphone) that I have with me anyway for media consumption and on which I don't have personal data. Perhaps I should even do that now as I am not really comfortable to run closed source software on my Ubuntu system in the first place.

Time to experiment with this option.

Today I have some tidbits of information on the state of LTE deployment in St. Petersburg in addition to my previous post on 3G. Despite my Russian SIM card of MTS proclaiming '4G' I did not yet get LTE service. However, my mobile already picked up four LTE networks so activation is probably not far away anymore or has perhaps already happened in the networks for which I did not have a SIM card.

With some additional digging I was able to get some more details:

The four networks shown in the screenshot are actually three physical networks as Yota and Megafon share a single 15 MHz carrier in a MOCN (Multiple Operator Core Network) setup in LTE band 7 (2600 MHz). That's probably not surprising as a quick Google search revealed that Yota was bought by Megafon last year. SIB-5 announces a 5 MHz carrier in band 20 (digital dividend 800 MHz) but I didn't pick up a signal there. And finally my German SIM card was properly rejected with cause code #15 (no suitable cells in this tracking area) to encourage an Inter-RAT cell reselection to 2G or 3G.

MTS is also active in Band 7 (2600 MHz) but 'only' with a 10 MHz carrier. My German SIM card was somewhat rudely rejected with cause code #111 (protocol error unspecified). While it serves the purpose it doesn't encourage the mobile to do an InterRAT reselection instead of looking for an alternative network operator which might not be good for capturing roamers. Perhaps something to look at in case anyone from MTS reads this post… But at least the network didn't send an 'EPS and non-EPS services not allowed' which would have made the mobile never to try the network again. No, I'm not kidding, I've seen this reject cause in the past in other networks. As my Russian MTS SIM card does not get service on the LTE layer I assume that the network is not yet live for real customers. I also get this impression from the 'intraFreqReselection' parameter which is set to 'not allowed', which is quite unusual, even in test networks.

And finally, Beeline was also present in Band 7 (2600 MHz) with a 10 MHz carrier and my German SIM was also rejected with cause code #111 (protocol error unspecified).

So no LTE for me this year but perhaps there will be service should I return next year. Let's see.

 

… and a quick follow up on my previous post about my 3G experiences in St. Petersburg. While in some places one can buy a local SIM card directly at the airport, St. Petersburg doesn't seem to be one of them. So as I first had to get to the city before I could buy the local SIM card for Internet connectivity I had to use another means to get to my email after landing and to get the data for my GPS receiver to get a quick location fix.

Using my home network SIM for the purpose was out of the question, roaming charges in Russia are way beyond anything reasonable. But my Toggle SIM offered an almost reasonable rate for small data transfers, 1.34 (UK) pounds per megabyte, altough it thought I was in Abkhazia. Well, not quite 🙂 Looking at the billing records, the 1.34 pounds are charged for every PDP context activation so you better leave the context up if you are reasonably sure there is only little data transferred until you have the local SIM card.